

FRANCE AND EUROPE

By VALENTIN BUISSON

In spite of its swift collapse in the summer of 1940, and in spite of the sad spectacle offered by its domestic developments since then, the French nation is and always will be a part of Europe. Europe has much to thank the French people for in the past and likewise expects much from it in the future. France's greatest weakness today is her spiritual uncertainty and disunity, which are in part the result of her inability to get out of the rut of tradition-bound, outdated thinking onto a new path more in harmony with reality.

Convinced that a study of France's relations to the rest of Europe will contribute toward clarifying her present position, we are now publishing an article written by a Frenchman living in East Asia. Like many of his countrymen, the author seeks for the reasons of the collapse of yesterday because he hopes to find in them pointers for the policy of tomorrow, and because he is concerned for France's future. He writes under a pseudonym.—K.M.

IF we observe the foreign policies of the five leading European powers during the last few centuries, we arrive at the following picture.

Russia's traditional foreign policy was that of expansion, with Moscow as its center, and always in the direction of least resistance, a policy which has led from a small principality ruled by Ivan the Moneybag (early fourteenth century) to the largest country in the world under Stalin.

In the case of Germany, on the other hand, no clearly defined foreign policy is discernible, since up to recent times there was no unified German state. The Germany of the Middle Ages, now known as the First Reich, vacillated in its foreign policy between expansion toward the east and campaigns in Italy. The subsequent dissolution of the First Reich into countless small states rendered any German foreign policy impossible, although some of the dynasties, such as the Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns, conducted their own dynastic foreign policies. During this time it remained the most important—although for long periods unacknowledged—goal of the Germans to form a united nation along the lines of other European states. This goal was not reached until modern times, under Bismarck and Hitler. It is only now

that one can speak of a truly German foreign policy which, during the last few years, has inscribed the foundation of a united Europe on its banners.

The development in Italy was similar to that in Germany. Here, too, the goal of a united and independent state was not achieved until 1870. Only since then can we discern a real foreign policy, a policy directed at turning the Mediterranean into the *mare nostrum* and creating a colonial empire in North Africa.

The Tudor kings of England, who laid the foundation for England's overseas expansion, introduced a policy toward Europe which has since become the maxim of British statesmanship: the balance of power, in other words, the attempt always to see to it that no single power achieve hegemony on the European continent but that the various camps always be more or less in a state of balance. This policy permitted England to devote herself without serious interference to the building up of her world empire. Whenever there was a threat of the establishment of a European hegemony, England threw her weight into the scales to restore the balance. In pursuit of this policy England has fought against every European power: Spain, Hapsburg, Russia, Germany and, most often of all, against France.

CLASSIC FORMULA . . .

France pursued the same policy toward Germany as England toward Europe. Since the days of Cardinal Richelieu, France saw in the Westphalian Peace (1648), which ended the Thirty Years' War, an ideal solution to the German question, a solution which became the classic French foreign policy:

Germany territorially and politically disintegrated, each of her hundreds of principalities jealously guarding its "liberties"; her emperor elected by a committee of princes, some of whom could be influenced from outside; and the French kings as protectors of this "German liberty," the liberty of the German princes to further their own interests at the expense of the Reich—in short, a balance of power between the various German states which would make the unification of the Germans into one powerful state impossible.

France dreaded Germany's unification with a morbid fear. It is true that the French Revolution of 1789 temporarily replaced the classic French policy by advocating the principle of nationalism and self-determination for all nations. In his St. Helena will, Napoleon I recommended sticking to this policy; and Napoleon III followed his advice when he gave support to Italy in her unification. But he returned to the classic policy in 1866 when Prussia undertook the unification of Germany. Italy paid for France's support by handing Savoy and Nice to France. Bismarck refused to pay for French consent with German territory: he paid with the war of 1870.

Had the foreign-policy principle of the French Revolution been followed consistently, it might have spared France and Germany, and Europe as a whole, a good deal of misery. But this policy has always been opposed by those attached to the classic system. In 1866, 1870, 1914, and 1939, the classic principle prevailed.

. . . AND "IDÉE FIXE"

Between 1870 and 1914, France energetically denied harboring seventeenth-

century aims against her neighbors and accused Germany of being the aggressor. During the Great War, however, the French again openly glorified the policy and aims of Cardinal Richelieu. Jacques Bainville's *Histoire de Deux Peuples*, written in 1916, enjoyed tremendous success and went into well over three hundred editions. It has remained the popular political bible of the French, a bible of Richelieu's political faith in which republicans and monarchists believe alike. It is significant that in 1935 Bainville was elected a member of the Académie Française. Maurice Barrés, another writer and member of this august body, calls this policy "France's eternal thesis" or "*idée fixe*." France was inundated with literature and pamphlets by which the French people were made to forget their revolution and familiarized once more with the policy and aims of their former monarchy and the meaning of the Westphalian Peace. To perpetuate or renew this state of German disunity has been the aim of French diplomacy for hundreds of years. To counteract it and to unify the Germans, was, of course, the aim of the leading German powers—principally Austria and Prussia.

What effect did this situation have on France's attitude toward the rest of Europe?

The French *Drang nach Osten* has been noticeable in European history since the sixteenth century, and this *Drang* was still very much alive in 1939. Yes, France, too, has her "urge toward the east," an urge toward German territory. Seen from the point of view of former centuries, this French urge must be considered just as natural as the German one. To conquer was then the noble occupation of kings. But this does not change the fact that the French *Drang* toward German territory and, simultaneously, the French "no" to German unity, must be considered as one of the main causes of the wars between France and the Germans and of the continual unrest in Europe. If, in these circumstances, France has in modern times suffered invasions, she has not much

ground for complaint. In former centuries, German soil formed the battlefield of Europe.

FRANCE AND ENGLAND

Britain's "balance of power" doctrine embraced the whole European continent, including France. The British policy allowed Germany to unite as a counter-balance against united France, but only as long as Germany did not transgress the proportions tolerable to England within this law of balance. This policy was not directed against Germany alone: it was directed against any power on the Continent which aspired to unite Europe under its leadership. That should have been a warning to France.

France's ambition for her own security, well-being, and aggrandizement was dictatorial preponderance on the Continent. This automatically made Britain her enemy. Did not Clemenceau say to Lloyd George soon after the Great War: "Half an hour after the Armistice I already had the impression that you had again become the enemy of France," to which Lloyd George replied: "Has this not always been the traditional policy of my country?"

Thus the community of interest between France and England was very limited and existed only during the brief stretches when their roads happened to run parallel. In all other cases the belief of France that she and England had the same aim was unjustified optimism; it was a belief in the possibility of squaring the circle.

There was another difference between London and Paris. As a continental power, France had to fight her wars with her own sons. Consequently, she welcomed any nation contiguous to Germany for permanent alliances, while Britain chose her allies only when the necessity arose. Britain always remained the master of her alliances; France often became their slave. During Napoleon's times and before, Prussia was good enough to fight for England against Napoleon; in 1914 and 1939, France was good enough to fight against Germany, to

bleed herself white and, finally, in 1940, to collapse for the same old England. All wars fought between France and England after England had been driven out of France in the fifteenth century were caused by the British "balance of power" policy. Up to the Napoleonic wars, France exhausted her man power and creative powers in wars against England. When, toward the end of the nineteenth century, England believed that Germany was upsetting the balance of power, she began to enlist allies against Germany. The most important of these was France.

In Britain it was the Prince of Wales, later King Edward VII (1841-1910), who was the motive force behind the group opposing the rise of Germany. Married to a Danish princess, he wanted his mother, Queen Victoria, to intervene against Prussia in the German-Danish war of 1864; and as early as 1866 he explained to the French Ambassador in London that an entente between France and Britain would serve the best interests of both countries. Queen Victoria refused to please her son, but she died in 1901 and Edward became King of England. Still, it was not altogether smooth sailing for him. The French Republic was anti-German all right, but at the same time it had not forgotten the history of its relations with England. Her colonial program had made France particularly anti-British.

COLONIAL POLICY

After 1871, Republican France at first properly estimated her own forces and knew well that national aspirations must in the first instance be backed by one's own national strength and creative genius. Thus France had first of all to reorganize herself and hope to recover her strength by creating a great colonial empire, in particular in North Africa. This diversion from the Continent toward colonial fields was exactly what Britain did not like. She was afraid of French colonial ambitions. If King Edward could direct France's interest away from Africa to the Continent, she would cease being a

rival in the colonial field and would become England's ally. After a lengthy and thorny struggle, Edward VII partially succeeded; but he did not live to see how the seed he had sown ruined France—and finally threatened the British Empire.

In those days, France still had many men of the highest integrity, men who knew England well and who preferred to go their own, a French way. Furthermore, great national hopes were placed in colonial expansion. The creation of a colonial empire gave France a new impulse after her defeat of 1871 in the Franco-Prussian War and became the Third Republic's object of national ambition and pride.

Because of French colonial ambitions, France and England were frequently at loggerheads. On one occasion it was over Newfoundland, on another over the New Hebrides or Siam. In those years France had not given up her hopes for Egypt, and Morocco was not yet French; Britain still hoped to complete her hold on the Mediterranean by the occupation of Egypt as well as of Morocco with its Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts. Thus there was friction time and again. As late as in February 1887, Lord Salisbury wrote to the British Ambassador in Paris: "It is difficult not to wish for another Franco-German war to finish with this endless bother."

During the latter part of the last century, relations between France and Britain were so strained that part of the British ruling class considered France the more dangerous rival and was prepared to make permanent arrangements with Germany, even at the cost of concessions to Germany in the Middle East and North Africa. Bismarck declined this British offer because he would not tolerate the idea of Germany acting the undignified role of a counterweight against France or any other country for England. Aware of historical realities, he demanded only the recognition of Germany's right to live a national life in security. He refused to wage a preventive war against France when it became clear that the Third Republic was looking for revenge

and was again basing its policy on Richelieu's legacy. He also refused to become Britain's tool and to spill German blood in support of Britain's ambitions.

In the years after Bismarck's dismissal, England gradually came to consider Germany as her enemy No. 1. Of course, a nation regarded by Britain as her enemy always has the alternative of voluntary submission. But whoever refuses to submit at the given moment—be it Spain, France, Holland, or Austria in former times, or Germany in our time—calls down upon himself the curse of righteous British indignation. He is mercilessly persecuted for wanting "world domination" and as the "disturber of world peace."

"ENTENTE CORDIALE"

As soon as Great Britain had made up her mind that Germany was the chief enemy, France was automatically expected to become Britain's ally.

During a dinner in Marlborough House on February 28, 1902, Joseph Chamberlain had his first intimate discussion with the French Ambassador Cambon on the possibility and necessity of an alliance between the two countries. But France had not yet then wholly forgotten her bitter political defeat at Fashoda in 1898 (see our issue of December 1942, page 380) and was in no mood to play the role of the dupe in Britain's game. When Edward VII arrived in Paris on an official visit in May 1903, the Parisians still greeted him with "*Vive les Boers! Vive Marchand!*" (Marchand was the name of the French commander at Fashoda.) Nevertheless, the foundation was laid during this visit for negotiations between the two powers.

Strange as it may seem today, the French politicians, blinded by their desire for revenge against Germany and for hegemony in Europe, fell into the British trap. In June 1903, Lord Lansdowne initiated the parleys with Ambassador Cambon in earnest; and, after very difficult and protracted negotiations, an accord on all outstanding colonial disputes

was reached in 1904. In it Britain declared that she had no interest in Morocco, and France definitely lost Egypt, which she had made accessible to Britain at great cost in lives. France also lost the Suez Canal, which she had built.

In 1898 Fashoda had made the French forget Alsace-Lorraine for a while; in 1904 the Entente Cordiale made the French forget Fashoda and revived their desire for Alsace-Lorraine. Now France turned once more fully and actively to her classic continental policy. The Entente Cordiale was a misfortune for France. From then on, her foreign policy was determined in London. British propaganda entered the country freely. The chances of coming to reasonable terms with the German neighbor dwindled. France had to train African natives to fill up her divisions, to consolidate the *pax britannica*.

If the Entente Cordiale had any meaning at all for France, it was the reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine, the conquest of the left bank of the Rhine, and the dismemberment of Bismarck's Reich. Britain on her part wanted by means of the Entente Cordiale to safeguard her nineteenth-century world order, to establish her position as supreme arbiter on the Continent, and to further her designs beyond the seven seas on her march to undisputed world hegemony and world exploitation. The Entente Cordiale was the beginning of a gigantic encirclement of Germany, with France and her Russian ally as Britain's swords which were to destroy Germany. For this we have the testimony of Lord Rosebery, for years Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister of the British Empire (and son-in-law of a Rothschild). These are the words with which David Lloyd George begins his six volumes of memoirs:

In the year 1904, on the day when the Anglo-French Entente was announced, I arrived at Dalmeny on a couple of day's visit to the late Lord Rosebery. His first greeting to me was: "Well, I suppose you are just as pleased as the rest of them with this French agreement?" I assured him that I was delighted that our snarling and scratching relations with France had come to an end at last. He replied: "You are all wrong. It means war with Germany in the end!"

All the world knows that a war followed upon the Entente Cordiale. If Britain managed to make the world believe that this war was a German war and that Britain only entered the war to save Belgium, France, civilization, and democracy, it shows that the British statesmen before the Great War were cleverer than those after that war, and that the German statesmen had not learned much from Bismarck.

For reasons of camouflage, to make the world believe that this war was not her war, Britain entered the war too late to stop the German advance through Belgium in 1914. Not until August 15 did the British land about five divisions at Dunkirk, Calais, and Ostend, while France had mobilized seventy divisions and Germany had put seventy of her divisions into the field on the western front. By January 1918, the French Command was still unable to obtain approximate figures of the forces Britain intended to send to France. By that time, twenty-nine nations had declared war on Germany and her allies. France had put her all into the struggle. Not until the spring of that year, when an Allied defeat seemed possible, did Britain send all available forces to France.

When Germany was finally brought to her knees, where did Britain's allies find themselves? Russia was a prey to Bolshevism, Italy was on the verge of a revolution, and France was bled white and exhausted (how exhausted, 1940 has shown). So the peace turned out to be a British peace and not a French one.

DISAPPOINTMENT

What had most Frenchmen, not to speak of Clemenceau and Poincaré, expected as compensation for France's sacrifices during the four years of an unprecedented war?

In his *Intimités de la IIIe République*, Ferdinand Bac describes a visit he made at the beginning of 1918 to the former French Ambassador to Berlin, whom he found marking a big map with a red pencil. The Ambassador said to Bac:

"The news from the front is good, in October the war will be over. One must start thinking what our conditions must be . . . With Alsace-Lorraine we have the left bank of the Rhine, the Germany of the Carolingians. Poland will be given Silesia. The Reich of Emperor Wilhelm must be dismembered. Hanover must return to England, and the Russians will get East Prussia. We will restore the small northern German states with Dresden as the capital; we will make a South German Federation of Austria, Bavaria, Baden, and Württemberg, with Vienna as the capital. In other words, we will return to the time before 1866. . . . In France I am republican, but to have peace we must restore the hundreds of small German principalities."

This is, no doubt, the meaning which most Frenchmen had seen in the Entente Cordiale, the meaning of Richelieu's classic policy.

Britain had good reason to be satisfied with the settlement of the Great War: Germany had no more navy and no more colonies; to keep her away from world politics would now be easy. France, on the contrary, without the left bank of the Rhine under her permanent control, with Germany undivided, with a devastated country, with delusive reparation promises and heavy war debts, was not satisfied. In the distribution of colonial spoils she had been largely cheated; and for what she had received in the Middle East, Britain caused her as much trouble as possible. Britain wanted the Middle East for herself and wished to get France out of Syria. (Churchill finished this job in 1941 by occupying Syria and Lebanon.)

France was now faced by the choice either of continuing her classic policy toward Germany or of finding a basis for European solidarity by coming to terms with the fallen enemy. The German statesmen, from President Ebert to Hitler, tried hard to come to an understanding with France. But, as Bruce Lockhart says in his *Retreat from Glory*, anyone in France daring to suggest a policy of reconciliation with Germany was considered a traitor. It is pathetic to read the interview Bruce Lockhart had with the German Chancellor Stresemann on April 13, 1929, in Berlin, six months before Stresemann died, and in which Stresemann said "that there were no Germans who would fight for the

return of Alsace-Lorraine, but there was not a German from the ex-Kaiser to the poorest Communist who would ever accept the present German-Polish frontier. With a rectification of the Polish frontier Europe could save peace for a hundred years."

ONE MORE "NO"

And Hitler? He too tried to do away with Versailles by peaceful means. Notwithstanding the disappointment he suffered at the Disarmament Conference of 1933 and his firm attitude toward the League of Nations, he made great efforts to arrange matters by negotiation. To this end he submitted a memorandum to Britain in December 1933, asking her to forward it also to France. In this memorandum Hitler proposed the limitation of Germany's armed forces to fifty per cent of the French effectives in men and material; the control, it was proposed, to be international and reciprocal. A somewhat different Italian memorandum supported the German note.

The German memorandum was undoubtedly a proposal for total revision of Versailles, inclusive of the territorial clauses. France was therewith confronted with a grave and far-reaching decision. She had the choice either of taking Germany's proposal into consideration, with the possibility that she would have to give up Richelieu's legacy, or of rejecting it and reaffirming that legacy. On April 17, 1934, about four months after she had been approached, France rejected the German proposals and thereby manifested her decision to uphold her postwar foreign policy and the European status created by the dictates concluded after the Great War.

After his victory in the Saar plebiscite, Hitler declared that, for the sake of peace, Germany was willing to renounce all further claims on Alsace-Lorraine and on any other territorial changes along her western border. Had France reciprocated the offer by a likewise voluntary acceptance of her Versailles boundaries as final, and without mental reservation, such a deal, voluntarily arrived at, would have closed a thousand-year-old

bad chapter of Franco-German and European history and would have given Europe a long period of peace. When France continued to stick to the "Westphalian idea," Germany rearmed without the consent of France and the others and gave preference to cannons instead of butter. To the last, Hitler tried to come to terms with France. But by then Britain had taken the lead, and France had become "a back number and unworthy of support," as the British Ambassador, Sir Neville Henderson, said to Dodd, the American Ambassador, in Berlin on June 23, 1937.

COLONIZED COLONIZERS

How did France hope to carry out her classic policy? Marshal Pétain has stated more than once: "We lost the war because we have not enough children." Hence, feeling too weak herself to control the development of Europe and to suppress the rise of young, strong ideas, France had to put her trust in others. She organized colonial armies with which she hoped to replace those missing children and to regain her seventeenth-century grandeur.

Apparently our leaders never realized that an army of primitive colonials could not replace her missing children and give France the necessary prestige for a hegemony on the Continent. They did not realize that, even with the colonial army of one million men which Marshal Foch promised to enlist after the Great War, they would not be able to impose their will and conditions on the German people for any length of time without endangering their own race and national existence. Having embarked on a policy of force, force had to be obtained from wherever it was obtainable and at any cost.

Henry Champly, in his book *White Women, Colored Men* (1936) says in despair: "We are being colonized by our colonials, by colored men." Champly is deeply concerned about the future of our race. He is afraid that France will soon belong to the half-breed races, and he appeals to the French women to save

the French race. But the remedy Champly proposes is in itself a half-breed one, a mixture of arrogance and decay. Obviously believing that it is too late for a complete cure, afraid of the drastic Moscow remedy of "complete mixture" or the radical Berlin "pure Aryan" remedy, and believing in the superiority of the so-called "democracies," he proposes a slow process "of adaptation, of alloy, of alliance" with colored races. In other words, the Moscow prescription applied in small doses.

THE WEB OF ALLIANCES

As the negroes of the French Empire were obviously not enough to support France's European claims, she had to look for allies. She drifted back to the same system of alliances which had precipitated the world into the Great War, only in a manifoldly exaggerated form. A system of alliances always creates countermeasures and makes wars unavoidable. In this particular case, the French alliances practically sabotaged the League of Nations, the real purpose of which was supposed to be the bringing about of co-operation among the nations on an equal basis, with fairness and justice for all. Furthermore, the French system of alliances was, from the beginning, not an altogether one-sided business: France's allies also expected something in return. Feeling their combined might, they became arrogant. Finally, the time came when they grew unmanageable and imposed their will upon their partner. In 1939 it was largely owing to the Polish attitude that the French and British negotiations with the Soviet Union failed, a fact which greatly contributed to France's catastrophe a year later.

A system of alliances is the vicious circle in politics. Besides causing herself and others a good deal of trouble by her alliances, France was compelled on the fateful third of September 1939, whether she liked it or not, to follow Britain and to declare war on Germany at a time when she was in no way prepared for war. Nominally, her obligation resulted from her alliance with Poland; in reality,

France had lost her independence and become a sort of British dominion on the day she signed the Entente Cordiale.

As France's system of alliances meant nothing but the encirclement of Germany, and as it was generally felt that encirclement is in itself a form of aggression, this system was ennobled by the new name of "collective security." Collective security was defined by Lord Lothian in his speech in the House of Lords on March 2, 1937, when he said:

"The argument that the nations which are satisfied with the *status quo*, the nations which want to prevent any alterations, should enter into something like a military alliance in order that they may be overwhelmingly and collectively stronger than any nation that seeks to alter the *status quo*, is nothing but the modernization of what in my view has been the fatal policy which has been maintained by the French Government since 1920."


It is noteworthy that France's net of alliances was to a large extent spun around the Germany of Weimar, long

before Hitler became a factor in German politics, indeed, even before *Mein Kampf* had been written. But after Hitler's advent to power, renewed diplomatic activity became noticeable between France and her satellites.

THE CHOICE

What did France choose? The impossible. In the forlorn hope of winning a "Westphalian Peace" after all, France declared Versailles to be the public law, the international order, the Magna Charta for the coming centuries. Minor changes, to which France yielded under pressure, were too insignificant to improve the situation created by her policy. Reconciliation was rejected.

In pursuance of Richelieu's legacy, in order to triumph completely over one of the most vital forces on the European continent and in the world, France hoped not only to perpetuate the status created



The French System of Alliances, 1919/39

Each line indicates a treaty, the dates showing when these treaties were concluded. All countries included in the French system of alliances are shown in black

by Versailles but also to obtain what Versailles had withheld from her. This is what one finds when analyzing the French postwar foreign policy; this alone was to all appearances the French postwar "idea."

Would history have blamed France for her policy if she had had the might, the moral power, and spirit on which such a policy must be based? Probably not. Because this policy ended in failure, most Frenchmen believe that their government's policy as such was right, but that the execution was wrong. A few of us, however, realized long ago that the policy was wrong because it was based on a moral and physical might which France no longer possessed.

Under such conditions alliances become mortgages with all the risks of foreclosure involved, especially if one has overcharged one's assets. France and her continental allies could not impose their will on Germany without Britain. And Britain, after the Great War, wanted peace for the consolidation of her gains and a Germany strong enough to counterbalance an aggressive France. Only when Germany again grew stronger than the British idea of balance permitted and when she refused to be governed by London, did Britain change her postwar policy and concentrate her enmity against Germany.

In the early thirties, Lucas Dubreton wrote in the *Crapouillot*:

What we know is that since 1918 we had to be content with the most disagreeable things from our British neighbors, that they always did their best to fetter, to obstruct, or to minimize us. One must be naïve to be surprised at that: never has England given a sign that she would leave the supremacy, or even the superiority on the Continent to any one nation. Since then the British have received several shocks, and this may bring us once more to a time in which they will again be more polite and friendly toward us.

Dubreton was right. In August 1934 Baldwin stated in the House of Commons that Britain's frontiers were not the white cliffs of Dover but the Rhine. In June 1936 Duff-Cooper, Minister of War, told the French: "Your frontier is our frontier!" And on July 27, 1938, Lord Halifax declared: "The friendship exist-

ing between both countries no longer depends on written agreements but is based on common thoughts and aims." London had again taken over the direction of France's foreign affairs.

One may wonder how France could ever have been fooled into the Entente Cordiale and into fighting for England during the Great War. But that France, after all the experiences made during the Peace Conference at Paris and afterwards, followed a policy which again played into the hands of the British and made France fight England's war, was more than foolish: it was criminal.

Lord Lothian, a man who knew much about the world between the two world wars, wrote a sentence on January 31, 1935, in *The Times*, which brilliantly illuminates the situation of this period: "War comes far more frequently from inability to change out-of-date political arrangements in time than from direct aggression."

For her inability to change out-of-date political arrangements France has had to pay a terrible price. Britain pushed her aside and occupied the place of the spider in the web France had woven. France herself became only one of the many flies entangled in the web which England now proceeded to use for her own policy, a policy which led in 1940 to the collapse of France.

Only a complete change of the ante-diluvian mentality of Europe and of the traditional political maxims of Britain and France, an all-round spiritual rebirth, can save Europe and her civilization from complete ruin. This warning was distinctly written on the wall in 1918. To have deliberately ignored this warning, to have broken faith with humanity at Versailles, not to have paved the way leading toward a new Europe, are the mortal sins of the Allies after their victory. The final result could only be frightful destruction.

"Nothing is settled finally until it is settled right!" said Abraham Lincoln. The time has come again for France to settle matters right. Will she do it?